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BUSINESS CYCLE RESPONSES AND THE






Central Bank of Chile
After marked fluctuations in the business cycle over the last fifty
years, the Chilean economy now appears to be less volatile and more
resilient to external shocks. Because Chile is a small and increasingly
open economy, analysts have long suspected that the amplitude of the
cyclical fluctuations in the business cycle is closely related to changes
in external conditions.1
 However, many open questions remain in this regard. To what
extent are the pronounced output fluctuations associated with ups
and downs in external conditions, and to what extent can they be
attributed to domestic sources? Are real or financial external shocks
the most important source of fluctuations? Has the increasing
international integration implied greater synchronization of the
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domestic cycle with external economic conditions? If so, does this imply
greater external vulnerability, or has resilience to external shocks
improved somewhat?
To address these questions, we adopt an empirical approach
using a vector autoregressive (VAR) model with block exogeneity.
We adapt the VAR model to the behavior of a small open economy
and then use it to characterize and decompose the behavior of the
Chilean business cycle. Since our model includes a comprehensive
set of variables, we can evaluate the importance of external, policy,
and other domestic variables for the business cycle. We are thus
able to assess how the economy has responded to different stochastic
disturbances, measure the contribution of these variables to the
business cycle fluctuations, and analyze the resilience of the Chilean
economy over the last half century.
A key feature in our analysis is that we impose some plausible
restrictions on relations among variables, following recent developments
in model specification and VAR estimation procedures. Following
Cushman and Zha (1997), Dungey and Pagan (2000), Hoffmaister and
Roldós (2001), and Buckle and others (2002), we use block exogeneity
for international variables to capture the small open economy feature
in the associated dynamic responses and for domestic policy variables
to deal with identification issues.
Several interesting results emerge from this analysis. First, real
and financial external shocks have significant effects on domestic
economic activity. The significant impact on the cyclical behavior of
the economy following external financial shocks (represented by the
volatility of the international financial markets and net capital inflows)
reflects the financial restrictions faced by an emerging economy like
Chile. Among domestic policy shocks, demand management policies
and structural policies affect business cycle fluctuations, as do other
domestic shocks such as investors confidence. Altogether, however,
foreign shocks have been the dominant source of domestic output
fluctuations, followed by monetary policy and structural policies. Fiscal
policy and domestic equity explain a relatively low fraction of the
volatility of the business cycle. Second, we provide evidence of an
increase in the Chilean economy’s resilience to external shocks in the
1990s. This positive development has taken place even as the economy’s
deepening integration with the rest of the world has increased the
synchronization of the domestic business cycle with international
conditions. This trend underscores the significant countercyclical role
played by policies.
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 provides a historical
overview of the Chilean economy since 1950, outlining the main
issues related to growth, recessions, and cyclical behavior. Section
2 describes the data and the methodological issues associated with
the VAR framework. Section 3 analyzes the impact of foreign, policy,
and other domestic shocks on the business cycle and the sources of
its fluctuations, while section 3 uses historical decomposition
analysis to provide insights on the economy’s resilience to shocks.
The final section summarizes our results and their implications
for economic policy.
1. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE CHILEAN ECONOMY
SINCE 1950
The GDP growth rate of the Chilean economy displayed an
upward-sloping trend over the last half of the century, starting at
around 3 percent in the early 1950s, hitting a midpoint of around 4
percent in the early 1970s, and ending at around 5 percent in 2003
(the last year of the sample period). The initial period was
characterized by frequent, but relatively moderate peaks and troughs,
with a somewhat low, but stable medium-term growth rate. Between
the 1970s and the 1990s, however, two very deep recessions took
place, with troughs in 1975 and 1982, respectively.2 From 1990
onward, the peaks and troughs were as moderate as in the first
period, but with a significantly higher medium-term growth rate
(see figure 1).
Recessions were not uncommon during the period covered by our
sample (1950–2003). The sample includes six periods of negative
growth: two in the 1950s (1954 and 1959), three between the early
1970s and early 1980s (1972–73, 1975, and 1982–83) and only one in
the late 1990s (1999). The relatively moderate recessions of the 1950s
are associated with important domestic economic policy events. The
recession of 1954 came about after the very large monetary expansion
at the beginning of the Ibañez administration (1952–58), which led
to a surge in inflation and a subsequent stabilization program under
the Klein-Sacks mission.3 Price stability was not achieved, however.
2. Observed fluctuations in the annual growth rate were as large as 24 percent
(for example, from –13.6 percent in 1982 to 10.6 percent in 1989).
3. Ffrench-Davis (1973) and Zahler and others (1978) contain detailed
discussions of the economic policies applied in Chile in the 1950s and 1960s.
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The Alessandri administration (1958–64) tried to use the exchange
rate to control inflation, but these efforts ended in a second recession
in 1959, when the fixed parity of the Chilean currency against the
U.S. dollar collapsed.4 After that period, the economy underwent
slowdowns in activity, but no other recession took place until the
early 1970s.5
Figure 1. Chile’s Annual GDP Growth, 1950–2003
Source: See table 2 and section 2 for details.
The recessions of the 1970s and 1980s were more frequent and
much deeper than those of the 1950s, and they included a full-blown
economic and financial crisis. The 1972–73 recession resulted from the
deep social and political crisis of the Allende administration (1970–73),
which ended with a military coup and seventeen years of
authoritarian rule.6 The 1975–76 recession was triggered by a sharp
deterioration in external conditions, particularly of the terms of trade,
in a period with very limited access to external financing owing to
the recent political turmoil of the early 1970s. This recession was
followed by a period of rapid growth, which ended suddenly with the
deep and prolonged recession of 1982–83—the second of the Pinochet
regime (1973–90) and the worst in the period under analysis. This
recession resulted from a sudden stop in capital inflows that forced
the reversal of the (unsustainable) current account deficit. As the
4. The Chilean currency in that period was the escudo.
5. The period 1964–70 corresponds to the Frei Montalva administration.
6. Edwards and Cox Edwards (1987) provide a complete discussion of the policies
of the Allende administration and the economic reforms of the Pinochet regime.
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terms of trade deteriorated and the international real interest rates
peaked, the adjustment required a sharp real exchange rate
depreciation. The vulnerabilities of the banking system aggravated
the recession. The very rapid increase in bank credit in the late
1970s and early 1980s—largely associated with foreign currency loans
and connected lending—resulted in a severe deterioration of the loan
portfolio and very high exposure to exchange rate risk. Although the
fiscal balance was in surplus and public debt was nil, the peso came
under severe market pressures that precipitated the second collapse
of a fixed parity in the last fifty years of Chilean economic history.
Notwithstanding the economywide crisis, a default on external debt
was avoided largely thanks to the initial low level of public debt.
The only recession of the 1990s was the short-lived and quite mild
one of 1999. This may reflect the increased resilience built through
years of significant reforms and institutional changes, including the
contributions of a solid banking system and a coherent macroeconomic
policy framework.7 The 1998–99 episode, like those of 1975 and 1982,
featured a sharp deterioration in external conditions that required a
reversal in the current account deficit, though at a much more
moderate level. The private sector reacted by reducing domestic
demand and adjusting asset portfolios to increase net foreign asset
holdings. The latter, together with the sharp contraction in the supply
of external financing, exerted strong pressures on the exchange rate.
The recession might possibly have been avoided if monetary policy
had not overreacted by narrowing the exchange rate band to limit
currency depreciation.8 The monetary authority feared that the
currency depreciation could lead to an acceleration of inflation above
the target and to financial system distress associated with the foreign
currency exposures. Thus, domestic real interest rates reached
extraordinarily high levels, and economic activity dipped. The
overreaction became evident the following year, when inflation fell
below the floor of the target range while the financial system did not
experience substantial problems. The move was rapidly corrected,
however, as the exchange rate was allowed to float in the last quarter
of 1999 and interest rates entered a prolonged phase of sustained
reductions that were instrumental for the recovery.
7. The prolonged slowdown of the economy that followed the downturn, which
is only recently coming to an end, has mirrored the unsupportive external
environment that prevailed until recently.
8. See Le Fort (2000).
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Most observers of the Chilean economy are of the view that the
economy’s outstanding performance in the 1990s can be explained
in terms of the reforms and stabilization process that began in the
1970s and continued through most of the 1980s and the 1990s. The
legitimacy offered by a peaceful transition to democracy, continued
opening up of the economy, further development of domestic financial
markets (including deeper integration with international financial
markets), and a significant strengthening of the macroeconomic policy
framework (including fiscal consolidation and successful price
stabilization) are all considered key factors. In the late 1990s, the
fiscal authorities adopted a self-imposed rule that targets a structural
surplus of 1 percent of GDP while allowing the automatic stabilizers
to operate throughout the cycle. Moreover, the Central Bank was
given full operational and administrative independence in the early
1990s, and its Board of Directors adopted an inflation targeting regime
that has been improved over the years. Given the currently supportive
external environment, and the strength of its policy framework and
institutional arrangements, Chile is very well positioned to quickly
return to faster medium-term growth.
1.1 GDP Cycles
In this paper, we measure the Chilean business cycle over the
last half century as the deviations of GDP from its long-term trend,
using a Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter (see Hodrick and Prescott, 1997).
As shown in figure 2, the evolution of the output gap over the sample
period is anything but monotonous, with marked fluctuations and
changing patterns. Cycles can be dated in a number of ways, which
can deliver different results in terms of identifying specific cycles.
The approach followed herein identifies eight different cycles, as
presented in table 1.9 The average length of the cycle—which includes
a low and a high phase—is seven years. One clear pattern is that the
cycles were much shorter before the mid-1960s than after (around
five years on average). The amplitude of the cycles also increased over
time, reaching a maximum in the fifth and sixth cycles (1969–76 and
1976–84) and then declining substantially in the last two cycles.
In the 1950s and 1960s the economy was fairly closed to the
rest of the world, with external demand conditions displaying very
9. The discussion in Cashin and McDermott (2004) is illustrative in terms of
how cycle dating depends on a set of self-imposed rules, the series over which
those rules are applied, and the starting point of the sample, among other things.
The cycle dating of table 1 closely follows one set of rules contained in that paper.
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low correlation with the Chilean business cycle. The economy was
thus rather insulated despite the relatively unfavorable external
demand and terms of trade, with an output gap that was close to
zero, on average, and with relatively low volatility. The volatility
of the output gap increased substantially between the 1970s and
1980s—along with the magnitude of the cyclical changes—and the
average output gap was negative. Most of the other variables also
display their highest volatility in this period, including external
demand conditions, terms of trade, net capital flows, growth in
real balances, and fiscal expenditure. As we show in section 4,
however, the volatility of the output gap relative to that of
international conditions as a whole increased substantially during
Figure 2. Chile’s GDP Gap with HP Filter, 1950–2003
Source: See table 2 and section 2 for details.
Table 1.  Chile’s GDP Cycles, 1950–2003
Period Duration Maximum gap Minimum gap Volatility
1950–55 5.5 5.6 –1.5 2.8
1955–58 4.0 3.8 –3.5 3.9
1958–64 6.0 0.9 –5.6 2.1
1964–69 5.0 3.4 –4.2 3.1
1969–76 7.0 9.8 –14.8 9.4
1976–84 8.0 15.2 –7.4 8.3
1984–90 6.0 0.5 –6.8 2.6
1990–04 14.5 6.6 –3.2 3.3
Average 7.0 5.7 –5.9 4.4
Source: See table 2 and section 2 for details.
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10. To prevent the typical tail problems common to this type of filtering process,
we use data of up to five years prior to 1950, when available. We also use forecasts
of up to two years for variables that are included in gaps, based on official forecasts
when available. These extra observations are then dropped.
11. The sectoral indices include agricultural products, mining products, and
manufactures. See WTO Statistical data sets at www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/
statis_e.htm.
12. The publication is part of a series of documents that includes Jeftánovic,
Jofré, and Lüders, (2000) and Jeftánovic and others (2003), which compile statistics
covering a long time span for a large set of variables for the Chilean economy.
13. In an alternative specification of the model, the terms of trade is replaced
by two variables: the real price of oil and copper (source: IMF).
this period. Finally, in the 1990s, the output gap was positive, on
average, and its volatility moderated significantly.
2. METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH
The data used in this paper are of annual frequency and cover
the period 1950–2003. Our empirical model includes twelve variables,
derived from both international and domestic series. International
series are used to construct five variables intended to measure real
and financial external shocks. Domestic variables include a proxy
for the Chilean business cycle (namely, the GDP gap, which is our
main object of interest), a group of five variables that control for
domestic policy shocks, and a variable that captures domestically
driven financial shocks.
Most of variables are measured in terms of gaps, that is, deviations
from the long-term trend calculated through a Hodrick-Prescott filter.10
Our first variable is a proxy for the external demand conditions relevant
to the Chilean economy, and it is constructed from sectoral indices of
World Merchandise Export Volume published by the World Trade
Organization (WTO).11 We use the sectoral share of Chilean exports
to aggregate these indices into a single index that captures the
dynamism of the external demand for Chilean products. As with most
domestic series, our source for constructing the sectoral share of
Chilean exports is Braun and others (2000), which contains many
series for the Chilean economy during the 1810–1995 period.12 We
extended the export shares series through 2003 using data from the
Central Bank of Chile. We used this same combination of sources to
obtain the terms of trade, which represents the other real external
shock in our empirical model.13
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The other three external variables measure financial shocks faced
by the Chilean economy. First, the foreign real interest rate
corresponds to the average secondary market rate of the three-month
U.S. Treasury bill minus the annual consumer price index (CPI)
inflation of the U.S. economy, based on data from the International
Monetary Fund (IMF). Second, we include a foreign equity variable
as a proxy for the uncertainty of international financial markets.
We construct this variable by taking the annual standard deviation
of daily real returns from the Dow Jones index (source: New York
Stock Exchange). Third, net capital inflows to the Chilean Economy
as a percentage of GDP is calculated as the current account deficit
net of international reserves accumulation over GDP through 1988
(Braun and others, 2000); thereafter, it is taken directly from the
Central Bank of Chile’s balance-of-payments statistics.
Most domestic variables are related to policy shocks. The first
one—the de facto openness of the Chilean economy, measured as the
share of exports and imports in GDP—is constructed through 1987 as
the sum of export and imports in Chilean pesos (from Jeftánovic, Jofré,
and Lüders, 2000), deflated by the Chilean CPI (from Jeftánovic and
others, 2003) and divided by real GDP (from Braun and others, 2000);
data after 1989 are from Central Bank of Chile’s balance-of-payments
statistics. The second variable—the real growth of money—is taken
from the Central Bank of Chile’s monetary and financial statistics,
available since 1960, and complemented with Jeftánovic and others
(2003) for the previous period. We use two variables as proxies for
fiscal policy—namely, the real growth of fiscal revenue and fiscal
expenditure. These two variables are taken from Jeftánovic, Jofré,
and Lüders (2000) through 1986 and from the Budget Office of the
Chilean Ministry of Finance (DIPRES) thereafter. Finally the real
exchange rate is taken from Jeftánovic and others (2003) through
1989 and from the Central Bank of Chile thereafter.
We also include domestic equity to capture business confidence.
This variable is constructed as the real returns of the stock index
(IPSA), which are taken from Braun and others (2000) through 1969
and from the Santiago Stock Exchange thereafter.
Finally, our main variable of interest is the business cycle, which
we construct from data on real GDP taken from Braun and others
(2000) through 1995 and the Central Bank of Chile thereafter. Table
2 summarizes the twelve variables included in our empirical model,
and table 3 presents descriptive statistics.
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2.1 Specification
We use a VAR model of the Chilean economy that contains twelve
equations corresponding to each of the variables described above. We
use Choleski decomposition and impose block exogeneity restrictions
consistent with the fact that the Chilean economy is a small open
economy, meaning that domestically determined variables cannot affect
the international block. Based on this approach—which let us reduce
the overall number of parameters estimated for most equations—and
our relatively large annual sample, we were able to estimate a VAR
with such a large number of endogenous variables. Moreover, the
dynamic structure of this model based on annual data is adequately
handled by including only one lag.14 The block exogeneity extension for
small open economies was first used by Cushman and Zha (1997) for
the Canadian economy. More recently, Dungey and Pagan (2000),
Hoffmaister and Roldós (2001), and Buckle and others (2002) use a
similar approach in applications for Australia, Brazil and Korea, and
New Zealand, respectively.
The equations in our model are thus arranged in a way that takes
into account the fact that a Choleski decomposition identification scheme
depends theoretically on the order of the equations, with the lag structure
of the model consistent with the small open economy case.15 Table 4
summarizes the order of the equations and the lag structure of the model.
Most of the equations for variables pertaining to the international
block precede the equations for variables pertaining to the domestic
block. Thus, the first three international variables—external demand
conditions, foreign interest rate, and uncertainty in international
financial markets—are completely exogenous to the other variables
included in the model, but they are interrelated with each other. That
differs from the case of the terms of trade, which is affected (only) by
the previous three variables but does not affect them.16 The final variable
14. This is unlikely to be the case for a model based on data with quarterly frequency,
which presumably may require four lags. The latter feature—together with the fact
that quarterly data for most of the series that we use in this model are available only
since 1986 and in some cases only since the early 1990s—prevents the estimation of a
VAR with a large set of endogenous variables based on quarterly data for Chile.
15. We considered a number of different orderings and found no apparent changes
in the results. This suggests that the structure of our lag restrictions considerably
limits the ordering problem with respect to a nonrestricted (Choleski) VAR.
16. In the alternative specification in which terms of trade is replaced by both oil
and copper prices, the oil price is allowed to affect external demand conditions, the
foreign interest rate, and uncertainty in international financial markets, and vice versa.
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of the international block, net capital inflows to the Chilean economy,
features no lag restrictions, since it could potentially be affected by all
the variables included in the model. We allow it to be contemporaneously
affected by the four international variables that precede it in terms of
the order of the equations. The lag structure of the equation associated
with a measure of trade openness (a medium-term domestic policy
decision) only depends on the lag for itself.17
The equation that accounts for monetary policy is assumed to depend
on the lag of itself, the foreign real interest rate, capital inflows, the real
exchange rate, and the two fiscal policy variables (namely, fiscal revenue
and fiscal expenditure). Fiscal revenue is assumed to depend on the lag of
itself, the terms of trade, and the output gap, while fiscal expenditure is
assumed to depend on the lags of itself, output, and fiscal revenue. The
other equations in the domestic block are those associated with the real
exchange rate, domestic stock returns, and the business cycle. These
equations feature no lag restrictions, the first two because they represent
domestic asset prices and the third because we do not want to restrict the
relationships of our main object of interest (that is, the business cycle).
This VAR specification satisfies the stability condition, as all the
eigenvalues lie inside the unit circle, and the evidence presented in the
following sections is robust to several changes. First, using different
orderings to identify the orthogonal shocks does not qualitatively change
the paper’s results. The only evident difference resulted when we shifted
output below domestic policy conditions: all impulse response functions
looked relatively similar, but the contribution of monetary policy to
business cycle fluctuations was significantly lower in this case, with
almost all the effect captured by domestic equity. Second, the results
are also robust to reducing or expanding the variables included in the
model.18 For example, we eliminated capital inflows, so as to leave the
whole group of external variables completely block exogenous.19 In this
17. Trade openness is presumably correlated with all the external variables,
including net capital flows, contemporaneously.
18. All these estimates are available on request.
19. It was suggested to us that the two external financial variables already included
in the model (namely, foreign interest rate and international capital market uncertainty)
might be enough to capture changes in external financing conditions to the Chilean
economy. The evidence, however, pointed toward an independent effect of capital
inflows. To capture such an effect in a more exogenous way, net capital inflows to
Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico as a percentage of their combined GDP were included
instead of net capital inflows to the Chilean economy. This variable turned out to
be statistically insignificant, suggesting that the common factor between capital
inflows to the most important Latin American economies and capital inflows to
Chile is not very relevant.
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case, most of the effect was captured by a higher persistency of the
output gap. We also tried expanding the model by replacing the terms
of trade with two separate variables—namely, the real prices of oil and
copper. Again, results were qualitatively similar regarding the
relationship between the other variables and the business cycle. We
also included a dummy variable to capture natural catastrophes (both
earthquakes and climatic conditions), given Chile’s geographical
characteristics. Contrary to our expectations, domestic output did not
display a statistically significant response to a positive innovation in
this natural catastrophes dummy variable, and all the other variables
maintained their impact and significance.20
3. MACROECONOMIC RESPONSES AND SOURCES OF
FLUCTUATIONS
This section presents the results of our VAR exercise, using impulse
response functions and variance decomposition analysis to illustrate
the effects and persistence of shocks on the different variables of the
empirical model. We start by describing the economy’s responses to the
five external shocks identified above, including two foreign real shocks
(external demand and terms of trade) and three foreign financial shocks
(foreign interest rate, foreign equity, and net capital flows). We then
address domestic shocks, covering five domestic policy shocks (monetary
policy, two fiscal policy measures, real exchange rate, and openness)
and a domestic equity shock. At the end of this section, we report our
results regarding the sources of business cycle fluctuations.
3.1 External Shocks
Figure 3 shows responses to a positive innovation to external
demand. Chilean output expands on impact with a lasting effect of
around two years. The peak response occurs in the first year. The
20. Earthquakes and sustained droughts were represented by a dummy
variable. Droughts were considered if the cumulative shortfall from normal rainfall
accumulated over the last four years exceeded 308 millimeters per year (which
corresponds to the sample average rainfall minus 10 percent of the sample standard
deviation). Following this definition, drought years are 1969, 1970, 1971, 1976, and
1996. Annual data on total rainfall was obtained from Dirección Metereológica de
Chile (2003). Similarly, only earthquakes with a magnitude above 7.0 on the Richter
scale that occurred less than 50 kilometers from the surface were considered as a
natural disaster with macroeconomic relevance. Following this definition,
earthquake years are 1960, 1971, 1975, 1985, and 1995 (Servicio Sismológico, 2003).
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external demand shock is also transmitted immediately into the
real exchange rate and the terms of trade, in different directions.
In particular, the appreciation of the real exchange rate and its
negative effects on output do not offset the positive effect that is
generated with better terms of trade. Economic activity then begins
to drop off in response to tighter monetary policy as the economy
starts to expand.
Figure 3. Response to an External Demand Shock
Response of output Response of terms of trade
Response of real exchange rate Response of money
Responses to a rise in the terms of trade are consistent with
conventional wisdom (see figure 4). In particular, an improvement in
the terms of trade implies a positive impact on the business cycle.
The effect on domestic output appears to be higher from the first year
on, with a lasting effect of five years even when the persistence of the
terms-of-trade shock is only two years. A terms-of-trade shock could
stem from a rise in the price of exports or a fall in the price of imports.
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Emphasis is usually placed on copper and oil prices in the case of
Chile. An alternative VAR that includes these prices instead of the
terms of trade shows that both shocks have the expected effects on the
business cycle, but their respective impulse-response functions are
not statistically significant. This suggests that the dominant source
for explaining business cycle fluctuations is a composite of export and
import prices, and not copper and oil prices alone. The public discussion
of the significant impact of copper prices on the business cycle may
thus be overstated.
Figure 4. Response to a Different Terms-of-Trade Indicator
Shock
Response of output to terms of trade shock
Response of output Response of output
to an oil price shock to a copper price shock
The responses to a rise in the foreign interest rate are illustrated in
figure 5. This shock is transmitted into lower monetary aggregates in
the first year. The corresponding increase in the domestic interest rate
translates into a lower demand for domestic equities, reducing real
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returns immediately. Consequently, domestic output eventually falls
in response to monetary policy tightening and the reduction in equities.
Figure 5. Response to a Foreign Interest Rate Shock
Response of output
Response of domestic equity Response of money
Figure 6 shows that an increase in the volatility of world equities
causes a negative impact on the real return of Chilean equities and a
decline in capital flows. This may reflect higher external financing costs
that could have an impact on the risk premium associated with emerging
markets. The combination of these negative forces has an immediate
negative effect on the business cycle that lasts two to three years.
Finally, an increase in net capital flows leads, as expected, to an
expansion of the business cycle on impact, which lasts one year (see
figure 7). This reflects the financial restrictions faced by an emerging
economy like Chile, in the sense that these restrictions imply that the
ups and downs of net capital flows have a significant impact on the
cyclical behavior of the economy.
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Response of output
Response of net capital flows Response of domestic equity
Figure 7. Response to a Net Capital Flow Shock
Response of output Response of domestic equity
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3.2 Domestic Shocks
Figure 8 tracks the responses to a monetary policy shock. After an
expansionary monetary policy shock, the impulse-response function for
the business cycle displays a hump-shaped pattern, with the peak effect
in the first year and a significant persistence of two years.
Figure 8. Response to a Monetary Policy Shock
Response of output
With regard to fiscal policy shocks, the first issue to be resolved in
an empirical study is what indicator to use as a measure of policy stance.
The usual candidate for this role is the fiscal deficit, but this measure
has several well-known problems that make it a weak indicator of
discretionary fiscal policy. The fiscal deficit captures both exogenous
policy shifts and the automatic reaction of fiscal variables to the state
of the economy. Even when changes in the deficit reflect purely
discretionary policy decisions, the source of the change—whether a
revenue adjustment or a change in government spending—is obviously
important for the expected response of the private sector. Consequently,
we consider the effects of expenditure and revenue separately. Fiscal
expenditures have a high component of policy discretion, while fiscal
revenues are explained not only by fluctuations in the tax regime, but
also by endogenous reactions following changes in economic activity.
Figure 9 shows the responses to positive innovations to fiscal
expenditure and revenue. The response of the business cycle is
expansionary and statistically significant in the case of government
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spending, but not in the case of fiscal revenue. This suggests that
domestic demand is relatively unresponsive to changes in fiscal revenues.
Figure 9. Response to a Fiscal Policy Shock
Response of output Response of output
to fiscal expenditure to fiscal revenue
A real exchange rate shock has a positive impact on the Chilean business
cycle, as shown in figure 10. The impact on output takes two years to
become significant, however, and it then lasts for another two years.21
Figure 10. Response to a Real Exchange Rate Shock
Response of output
21. An increase in the real exchange rate represents a real depreciation of the
Chilean peso.
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Figure 11 shows that the business cycle reacts positively—but with a
lag of three years and a lasting effect of two years—to an increase in the
openness of the economy. Since we use de facto openness, the variable reflects
a combination of policy decisions and endogenous reactions. If we assume
that the trajectory of the variable is influenced mostly by policy, greater
openness appears to have helped moderate the impact of external shocks.
Figure 11. Response to an Openness Shock
Response of output
Finally, figure 12 illustrates the responses to a positive innovation to
domestic equity returns. This domestic financial shock has a positive impact
in the business cycle in the first year, but the effect vanishes thereafter.
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Figure 12. Response to a Domestic Equity Shock
Response of output
3.3 Sources of Business Cycle Fluctuations
We carried out a variance decomposition analysis to determine
what fraction of the variance of the Chilean business cycle is
attributable to each shock (see table 5). The results can be summarized
in three main findings. First, foreign shocks have a substantial effect
on business cycle volatility, with external demand and foreign equity
(volatility) shocks representing the dominant source of domestic output
fluctuations.22 Foreign shocks represent 28 percent of business cycle
fluctuations in the first year, reaching 42 percent in the third year.
Second, domestic equity shocks and fiscal policy shocks have relatively
little impact on the business cycle, whereas trade openness and the
terms of trade explain a much larger fraction of business cycle
fluctuations. Finally, monetary policy shocks play an important role
in explaining the forecasting error variance of the business cycle.
22. In one of the most recent assessments using a VAR model, Buckle and others
(2002) reach a similar conclusion in which international variables—particularly
world output, world equity prices, and world interest rates—are the key sources
of volatility in New Zealand’s real GDP. Similarly, Parrado (2003), in an empirical
work that identifies the geographical sources of external shocks that have
influenced the New Zealand business cycle, finds that volatility in Australian
interest rates and U.S. equity prices are important sources of business cycle
fluctuations.
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4. SHOCK RESILIENCE OF THE CHILEAN ECONOMY
The variance decomposition analysis presented in the previous
section confirms the common wisdom that fluctuations in the Chilean
business cycle are largely explained by external shocks. The prominence
of external shocks is due to the country’s condition of being a small
open economy—open to both trade and financial flows—with an export
structure that is not sufficiently diversified and with limited access to
international financing. Indeed, external shocks explain more than twice
as much of the business cycle fluctuations as domestic shocks. In this
section, we undertake a historical decomposition analysis to explore
the volatility and resilience of the Chilean economy and its correlation
and synchronization with international shocks.23
4.1 Historical Decomposition
In analyzing the effects of different combinations of shocks on output,
including how the output response to those shocks has evolved over
time, we divide business cycle fluctuations into different components:
international conditions, policy conditions, other domestic shocks, and
a remainder that includes the inertial or lagged effect and the error
term (that is, other shocks that we do not control for). Then, we assess
how the importance of these different components has evolved over time
and whether domestic policies have contributed to moderating the effects
of international shocks. The latter would suggest that the economy’s
resilience to external shocks has increased.24
23. We decompose the historical values of a set of time series into a basis projection
and the accumulated effects of current and past innovations. This decomposition
allows us to observe whether movements in the business cycle were likely the result
of a combination of innovations or of a specific variable. The historical decomposition
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where the first summation represents that part of yt+j due to innovations in periods
t + 1 to t + j and where the second part is the forecast of yt+j based on information
available at time t. If u has n components, the historical decomposition of yt+j has
n + 1 parts: the forecast based on information at time t (the term in parentheses);
and, for each of the n components of u, the part of the first term that is due to the
time path of that component.
24. Data limitations prevent us from using a more straightforward approach
to this issue—namely, the estimation of separate VARs within two subsamples,
which would amount to looking for evidence of a structural break in the response
of output to international conditions, policies, or other domestic shocks.
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Figures 13 and 14 show the business cycle fluctuations divided by
the different components described above. The international conditions
component includes external shocks—both real (external demand and
terms of trade) and financial (foreign interest rate, volatility of
international financial markets, and net capital flows). The policy
conditions component encompasses the effects of changes in monetary
and fiscal policy (from both the revenue and expenditure sides) and the
effects of changes in structural policies, captured by the degree of
openness to international trade and the real exchange rate.25 Finally,
other domestic conditions refer to the effect of changes in domestic stock
market prices that are beyond the medium-term average return.
Figure 13. GDP Cycle and Components
Figure 13 shows that cyclical output fluctuations are mainly
explained by international and policy components, while the effect of
other domestic shocks appear to be much smaller. The remainder
component (lagged output and an error term) also plays an important
role, primarily because of the autocorrelation of the output cycle.
Real and financial international conditions appear to make similar
contributions to the cyclical fluctuations of output (see figure 14). The
total effect of international conditions on the output cycle does not show
significant changes in terms of magnitude across the sample. This is
25. We consider this variable a structural policy because the fact that the
Chilean economy was characterized by different exchange rate regimes over the
sample period implies that the adjustment process followed by this relative price
changed over time as a result of exchange rate policy decisions.
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not the case of the policy component, which appears to have had broader
effects on the cycle in the first two-thirds of the sample period than in
the final period. With regard to policy components, monetary and fiscal
policy have larger effects on cyclical output fluctuations than exchange
rate and trade policies (structural component).
Figure 14. International Conditions and Policy Conditions
A. International conditions
B. Policy conditions
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4.2 Volatility and Resilience
Output volatility, measured by the ten-year rolling standard
deviation of the output gap, reached peaks in the late 1970s and early
1980s, as shown in figure 15. The differences are such that the gap
volatility in peak years was up to three times the level of the calmer
years of the 1960s and 1990s. The volatility of some of the components
of the output gap also reached sustained peaks that extend from the
mid-1970s to the early 1980s, as in the case of policy conditions and the
remainder. In the case of international conditions, volatility peaked in
the mid-1980s. Other domestic shocks present a relatively stable and
low volatility throughout the sample period.
Figure 15. Volatility of GDP Gap and Components
Ten-year rolling standard deviation
The peak in the GDP gap volatility cannot be associated with a
single factor. While the volatility of international conditions increased
steadily until the mid-1980s and then declined, the volatility of policy
conditions and the remainder also contributed to the peak. Consequently,
the increase and subsequent fall of output gap volatility was much more
marked than that of any individual component considered on its own.
The volatility of international conditions, both as a whole and in its
real and financial components, reached a maximum in 1970–90 and
then fell sharply in the 1990s (see figure 16). However, the drop in the
volatility of external conditions in the last decade of the sample period
is not nearly as marked as that of the output gap or policy conditions.
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Figure 16. Volatility of Gap Components: International
Conditions and Policy Conditions
A. International conditions
B. Policy conditions
The policy conditions component registered the largest reduction in
volatility, even larger than the output gap itself. This suggests that
demand management and structural policies have made an economically
significant contribution toward moderating business cycle
fluctuations—in terms of both magnitude and amplitude. This outcome
reflects the strengthening of the macroeconomic policy framework and
an ongoing process of institutional building. On disaggregating this
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trend, we find that the volatilities associated with structural and
monetary policies fell to about half their previous values, while the
volatility of fiscal policy fell much more markedly.
Resilience is commonly defined as the capacity to withstand shocks.
It can thus be understood as the economy’s capacity to limit the volatility
of the output gap when confronting exogenous shocks. To measure
resilience to external shocks—the most important type of exogenous
shocks faced by the Chilean economy—we compute the ratio of the
volatility of external shocks to the volatility of the output gap.26 As
presented in table 6, resilience to external shocks deteriorated markedly
in the 1970s and 1980s and then improved sharply in the 1990s, to a
slightly higher level than in the 1950s and 1960s. The deterioration in
the resilience to external shocks in the 1970s and 1980s was to external
shocks of both a financial and a real nature. However, the subsequent
recovery of resilience in the 1990s was concentrated on external shocks
of a financial nature.
Table 6.  Resilience to External Shocksa
Period Total Financial Real
1950–69 0.61 0.42 0.55
1970–90 0.40 0.26 0.29
1991–2003 0.63 0.46 0.30
a. Volatility ratios of external conditions against the output gap.
4.3 Correlation and Synchronization
As the economy’s integration with the rest of the world deepens,
the synchronization of the domestic business cycle with external
conditions is expected to increase. The evidence gathered in the previous
section, however, suggests that the economy has become more resilient
to external shocks. An interpretation that helps reconcile these facts is
that policy actions can play a role as shock absorbers. Improved resilience
to external shocks may result from policy actions that more effectively
stabilize output, which would be manifested, for example, in a shift in
the policy component from procyclical (positive correlation with the
output gap) to countercyclical (negative correlation).
26. An alternative way to look at resilience is to analyze the contributions of
the different components along the cyclical downturn. The results obtained through
a preliminary analysis using this approach were qualitatively similar.
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Over time, the Chilean business cycle has become increasingly
associated with international conditions. The correlation coefficient
increased from 0.45 in the first period (1950–69) to 0.60 in the second
(1970–89) and almost 0.65 in the third (1990–2003). In other words,
the domestic and external business cycles have indeed become more
synchronized (see figure 17).
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In sharp contrast with the pattern of increasing correlations
described above, the correlation between policy conditions and the output
gap increased only from the 1950s and 1960s to the 1970s and 1980s. It
then dropped dramatically to almost zero in the 1990s. In other words,
policy actions—which were highly procyclical in the past—played a
cyclically neutral role after the early 1990s. A closer look at the
correlations of the individual variables contained in the domestic policy
component shows that the drop in correlation in the 1990s was
widespread, but the shift from procyclicality to countercyclicality is
fully captured by structural policies for the period as a whole.
Hence, the continuous trade opening (which allows the trade balance
to adjust smoothly to negative external shocks) and the increasingly
flexible exchange rate (which enhances the real exchange rate’s role as
shock absorber) were the main contributors to the increased resilience
of the 1990s. Monetary policy also contributed to eliminating procyclical
policy conditions in the 1990s. That is not the case, however, for fiscal
policy, whose correlation with the business cycle remained stable relative
to the 1980s.
On the whole, the countercyclical role of economic policies became
evident only in the 1990–2003 period, but a detailed examination of the
timing of the fall in the correlation between domestic policies and the
output gap shows a somewhat different pattern (see figure 18). The
correlation with fiscal policy started falling in the early 1980s, but it
increased again in the mid-1990s, while the correlations with monetary
and structural policies started falling in the late 1980s and became
negative in the last years in the sample. The process has not been
continuous, however, with some reversals associated with significant
episodes in policymaking.
The correlation of the output gap and structural policies fell
sharply after the widening of the exchange rate band was initiated
in 1991, reaching a negative value in the mid-1990s. The correlation
increased around 1998, probably in response to the narrowing of the
exchange rate band, and it fell again from 1999 onward, after the
elimination of the band.
In the late 1980s the correlation between monetary policy and the
GDP gap was positive and quite high (0.8). This correlation fell
continuously, in the 1990s, as the independent Central Bank developed
its inflation targeting framework and gained credibility, although a
short interruption occurred in 1998 as a result of the narrowing of the
exchange rate band and the hike in interest rates that paved the way
to the short-lived recession of 1999. After that, the correlation continued
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to fall, with monetary policy becoming countercyclical in 2002 and 2003.
This result reflects the full-fledged inflation targeting framework
currently in place and the associated reduction in interest rates over
the last four years.27
Finally, the correlation of fiscal policy and the output gap fell
markedly after the 1982 debt and banking crisis, even reaching negative
values toward the latter part of the 1980s. In the second half of the
1980s, a strong economic recovery from the depressed post-crisis
conditions took place within the framework of an IMF-supported
program, which included an important fiscal consolidation effort. This
accounts for the negative correlation between the output gap and the
fiscal component. The correlation of fiscal policy and the GDP gap
increased again in the 1990s, becoming positive in 1992 and reaching a
maximum in 1997 as fiscal policy regained its procyclical
characteristics. In this period, a policy of constant nominal fiscal
surpluses was pursued. Fiscal expenditures therefore mirrored the
cyclical pattern of fiscal revenue, which is largely determined in Chile
by private spending given the high share of the VAT in total revenue.
Figure 18. Correlation of GDP Cycle versus Policy
Conditions Components
Ten-year rolling correlation coefficients
27. The latter has contributed to the recovery from the prolonged economic
slowdown that followed the downturn. According to most analysts, the negative
output gap is expected to be closed in or around 2005.
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At the end of the 1990s, the current administration of President Ricardo
Lagos corrected the pro-cyclicality of fiscal policy by adopting a fiscal
rule that allows automatic stabilizers to operate fully across the cycle.
The operation of this fiscal rule should cause the correlation between
the fiscal component and the business cycle to converge toward zero.
Overall, the strengthening of the policy framework in the last period
of the sample (including the floating of the exchange rate, the adoption
of the fiscal rule, and the refinement of the inflation targeting framework)
seem to have played a significant role in the observed increase in the
economy’s resilience. This bodes well for these positive developments to
be sustainable in the future.
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we estimated a VAR model for a small open economy
like Chile by introducing block exogeneity into the lag structure of the
model. First, to take a relatively long view, we draw on an extended
sample dating back to the 1950s. Second, to better capture the
characteristics of the Chilean economy, we include an expanded set of
variables that let us account for the impact of external shocks (both of
real and financial), domestic shocks (including policy variables that
capture both demand management and structural policies), and other
domestic shocks. We use this toolkit to analyze the associated dynamic
responses of the business cycle to several shocks (impulse responses),
the sources of business cycle fluctuations (variance decomposition), and
the shock resilience of the Chilean economy (historical decomposition).
Several interesting results emerge. First, in terms of the impulse
response analysis, real external shocks (domestic demand and terms of
trade) have significant effects on domestic economic activity. We provide
evidence that the terms of trade, which reflect a composite of export
and import prices, captures the dynamic response of the economy better
than copper and oil prices alone. Furthermore, financial external shocks
are transmitted to the domestic economy through several channels,
and they have significant effects on domestic economic activity. The
significant impact in the cyclical behavior of the economy following a
shock in either the volatility of international financial markets or net
capital flows reflects the financial restrictions faced by an emerging
economy like Chile. Among domestic policy shocks, demand
management policies (represented by monetary policy and government
spending) and structural policies (represented by the real exchange rate
and trade openness) significantly affect business cycle fluctuations, as
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is also the case of other domestic shocks such as business confidence
(represented by stock returns). In contrast, we did not find evidence to
support the belief that natural catastrophes such as droughts and
earthquakes have a significant impact on economic activity.
Second, our variance decomposition analysis indicates that foreign
shocks have a substantial effect on business cycle volatility. In
particular, external demand and foreign equity (volatility) shocks were
the dominant source of domestic output fluctuations in the sample period.
Other external shocks—in order of importance and at some distance—
include the terms of trade, net capital flows, and international interest
rates. Among policy variables, monetary policy is the most important
source of business cycle fluctuations, with a contribution similar to
that of the most important external shocks. Structural and fiscal policy
policies explain a relatively low fraction of business cycle fluctuations.
Finally, our historical decomposition analysis provides ample
evidence that the resilience of the Chilean economy increased in the
1990s. This positive development took place even as the deeper
integration of the economy with the rest of the world resulted in increased
synchronization of the domestic business cycle with international
conditions. This pattern underscores the significant countercyclical role
played by policies, particularly monetary and structural policies.
The most straightforward policy implications of the results presented
in this paper are that good policies matter and that demand
management policies are a necessary complement of structural policies.
This is clearly demonstrated by the increase in the Chilean economy’s
resilience throughout the 1990s, a period in which domestic policies
were rather complementary. The profound economic reforms of the 1970s
and 1980s undoubtedly played an important role in Chile’s outstanding
growth performance between the mid-1980s and 1997—that is, before
the prolonged slowdown period that resulted from the Asian and Russian
crises and the unsupportive external environment that characterized
the global economy until recently. The policies of the 1970s and 1980s
were highly procyclical, however, and the economy was therefore
vulnerable to external shocks. Indeed, the economy underwent two large
recessions during that period. Hence, the incumbent and future Chilean
economic authorities should continue on the path of strengthening the
macroeconomic policy framework and managing it skillfully. If they do
so, we would expect the Chilean economy to further improve its already
high level of shock resilience. If they do otherwise, resilience could easily
deteriorate, and given the uncertainties embedded in the global
environment, the economy could return to more turbulent times.
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With regard to future research, adding more structure to the small
open economy VAR could yield further insights by allowing a more
accurate identification of shocks. In particular, the changing policy
framework of the last fifty years is an important barrier to successfully
fitting a more particular structure to the contemporaneous matrices
implicit in the VAR estimation. One way to tackle this issue is to pursue
a similar study using quarterly data for the last decade. Preliminary
exercises suggest that a structural VAR model fitted on a quarterly
sample covering a shorter period could potentially be well equipped to
capture the dynamics of the data. The number of variables included in
the VAR may need to be streamlined, however, considering the typical
autocorrelation pattern that characterizes data at this frequency. Also,
in line with Parrado (2001), a direction in which to build on the model
developed in this paper is to evaluate the impact of foreign shocks and
monetary policy on both the business cycle and inflation variability
and its tradeoff.
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